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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

~ALT LAKE

corpora ti on,

~

CTTY, a mnnicipal
Plaintiff a11d Respondrnt,

v.
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY
LOYE.TOY, aka THELMA ALLRED,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF

T~ ~FPPOR'l'

OF

Case No.

)

10752

P~~'l ITIOX
1

rrhis matter was heard on aprwal and on Jul>' 17, l9G/,
a thne to two cl<•eision \Yas fi1Pd hy tl1<> Co mt . .T nstice
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Ellett and Chief .Jnstict> Croek<.~tt filing writtt>n dis:-;('nts,
with .Jnstict~ Ell(•tt basing 11is dissPnt on lll-S-41, lTtah
CodP AnnotatPd 1953, and Chief .J irnticP Crockdt not
l'Pfe1Ting to the pre-emption prohlem bnt speaking onl>'
of lack of certainty and Jll"Psmuption of validity of h-'gislation, citing a1' authorit>· "rn>· <'OlH'UITing opinion in
.lonPs v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d ·-------··--· 428 P. 2d HiO,
and autl10ritil'S therPin cih•<l." Both tlll' rtah and Pacific
('itations show that opinion to hl' a dissPnt and not a
('Oncnrrmg opm1on.
11 he City fi!Pd and st'rn<l a tirnPly petition for rPhearing which was acted on ex parte by the Supreme
( 'ourt, without opportunity for the a1)pellant to answer,
as pro,~idPd hy 76(P) (2) and
The mattPr was set
for rehearing on SPpternhPr 11, 19G7. Fpon appearance
of connsel for argument, District Judge Cowley was sit-

un.

ting in place of Justice Callister for all cases set for that
date. The Chief Justice statPd, "Jnstice Callister is out
of tlw state. J ndgP Cowlt>y will sit in his place today."
he mattPr was heard on SeptPmber 11, 1967.

1
'[

Counse 1 wrnte a letter to tlw flu1irPrne Court, attPntion .Jnstic<' Crockett, citing Cord1wr

1'.

Cord11er, supra,

and othPr cases relative to the JwrsonnPl of tlw Conrt on
r<'hearing.
On Fehruary 9, 19G8, a new decision was filed, again
a threP-two decision, with thP former dissenters concurring with the Disfrict ,Judp;<> who authon•d the new major-

6

ity 01)Jl11on, .Justi<·<· 'l'n<'kett and .JustieP HPnrio<l filing
\nith•n <fo;sents.
ln writing tlw initial majority opm10n, Justice
Tuckett Pxpr<~ssly n'served appellant's Points II and III .
•Judge Cowley, in the second majority opinion, disposed of Point II with two paragraphs under reiteration
of the erronPous citation of Chief Justice Crockett's conc11rri11g opinion in Jones v. Logan City, supra.
Point III of aprwllant's appt>al is not disposed of
nor refrrred to in 0itlit>r opinion otlH~r tltan .Judge
'l'nekdt's resnvation thereof .

.\IHiU~IKKT
POINT I
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS PREMATURELY GRANTED, WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY TO
ANSWER SAID PETITION AS CONTEMPLATED BY
76(e) (2), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1953, THE PETITION HAVING BEEN GRANTED
WHILE APPELLANT WAS COMPILING AN ANSWERING BRIEF AND WHILE APPELLANT STILL
HAD 8 DAYS OF HER ANSWERING TIME REMAINING, UNDER THE ABOVE RULE.

As .Justice Callist<>r is not in tll(' <·tuw at tlw ]Jl'<'S<'nt
time, ther<> is no way to ddermine ''Thether he would
have assPnted to a rPlwaring, therehy making a majority
had the appellant hPen allow<:>d the time to answer by
Rn le 7G( <') (2), Ftah Rnles of CiYil Procedure 195:3.
which d<ws not contemplate an ex parte hearing, and

'/

had appt'lla11t\; counsel lw<:>11 afforded U1t> opportunity to
present his sidv.
lf the H'cords should show that .Justicl' Callister
"disqualified himself" rather than heing absent at the
time of rt'hearing, the question is posed: "Did he (being
disqualified) have the capacity to join in the granting
of th(~ rehearing?"

If he did not, it would leave a two-two split of the
Court \vith the prior decision of the Court bt-ing necessarily affirmed. Set~ Cordllcr 1.:. Cordner, suvra, and also
Wendelboe 1j. Jacouw11, et al., 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P.2d
] 78, where one judge concurring with the majority voted
for rehearing, lem·ing a hrn-two split, Justice -Wade
ha\·ing dis<1nalified himself prior to the original hearing.
POINT II
THE CITY'S PETITION AND/OR ITS BRIEF IN
SUPPORT THEREOF FOR REHEARING SETS UP
NO GROUND FOR REHEARING, MERELY ASKING
THAT THE COURT RECONSIDER MATTERS CONSIDERED ON THE ORIGINAL HEARING.

All three of the City's points on rehearing were
merc>ly a re-hash of matters thoroughly considered by
thP Court following the initial hearing and resulting
in a Court divided three to two for reversal. The arguments on rehearing did not result in a change of the
opinion of any judge sitting on the rehearing, but in
pffret constitute a hearing heforP a court
lll<'111lwr;

~with

a ne\Y

and is not in accordance with the purpose of

rdwarings, lrnt is a <·ulmination of the dangers pointed
out in Cordn('r r. Cord11er, supra. See Dnchcneait i:.
f/oitse, 4 lTtah 48:1, l1 P. G19:
"Bowman .J. 11 lw iwtition for rehearing states
no new facts or grounds for reversal of the lower
court. It is mainly a reargument of the casP. We
have n•pl•atE>dly callE>d attention to thP fact that
no rehearing will be granted whPr(• nothing new
and important is offered for our consideration.
\VP again say that we cannot grant a rel waring
unless strong showing therefor be made. A reargnrnent, or argument with tlw court upon points
of the decision with no new light giv<>n, is not
sneh a showing."

To tlw sarne effect Jones v. Howw and Hansackfr v.
1Same, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. G19, and see C1tmmings v. Nelson,
42 Utah 157, 129 P. G19, where at page 624 of the Pacific
citation .Justice Frick discnsses rehearings.
It is evident that the pnrpose of a rehE>aring is to
convince the court or mernhers therE>of that it Nred or
misconstrued tlw law or facts, and not to present the
original iss1w or issnPs to a conrt composed of two
of the orginal majority, hoth of the original dissenters,
and with a fifth judgP :"eleet<'d hy the Chief .Justice, in
this instan('e a rnernher of tliE> minority in the initial

hearing.
POINT III
THE RECORD INDICATES THAT JUSTICE CALLISTER DID NOT AFFIRMATIVELY DISQUALIFY
Hll\ISELF, BUT WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE CHIEF
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JUSTICE AS BEING "OUT OF STATE'' WHEN THE
MATTER CAl\IE ON FOR REHEARI:'.'\G.
S<'<' di:-;<·us:-;ior1 in Poi ni l.
POINT IV
THE MAJORITY OPINION DISPOSES OF THE CONSTITUTION AL VAGUE NESS AND AMBIGUITY
POINT WHICH WAS EXPRESSLY RESERVED BY
THE ORIGINAL MAJORITY OPINION BY ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE ONE PHRASE OF A
SUBSECTION OF AN ORDINANCE WITH ONE CITATION, "SEE CHIEF JUSTICE CROCKETT'S CONCURRING OPINION IN JONES V. LOGAN CITY, 19
UT AH 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160."
THAT OPINION IS A DISSENT AND IT IS EXPRESSLY AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF THE
COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING JUSTICE CROCKETT'S USE OF THE SAME CITATION IN HIS DISSENT IN THE OPINION ON THE FIRST HEARING
OF THE CASE WHERE IT WAS ALSO REFERRED
TO AS A CONCURRING OPINION.

r1 1Jip rnajorit~· opinion on n•hparing s1wnds the last
two parngravht-i on thP amwllant's Point II r<:>garding
vagne1wss and arnbignity attempting to solve the problem
h.Y ignoring all hut one phrasP of subsection 7 of the
ordinancP, to wit, sexnal intPrcourse for hire:
"(7) Direct or offer to dirPd an_,. pert-1on to any
place or building for the }HU})OS<:> of committing
anv lewd act or act of Rexnal intN<·o1n-s<' for hire
or ·of moral pervPrRion."

'11hit-i i:-; not thP law with r<'gard to Hewrnhi lity. rl'nw,
in onlinan('Pl-:' having· sPveral :-;nb:,;edions, it hat-; at times
l><·Pn lH'ld tliat onP snhsPdion may fail and tlw rPmaining
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~nhH·<·tions of an onlinarn·(• n•1tiain valid, dqwmling on
tlw inknt of tlw lq.~ii-dativP body 0nacting thf' statute
01 onlinanC'<'. H<nn•n•r, tlw writPr finds no precedt>nt for
snhdi,·iding or s<•gr<'gating a suhs<·ction of an ordinance,
liolcli11g 01w word or plirmw valid and the rPst invalid.
This <l<ws not stand the test of severability. See McQitil1i11 J/1111ici1)(/l Corvorotions, 3rd Ed., Yol. G, page 155,
et s<'q. ThP ea:s<' cit<•d as authority for th<' majority's
ltolding on tlw ambiguity point ignores snch easPs as
fitate r. Jll/.'iSi'r, us Utah 537, 223 P.2d rn3, and the
Fnifrd Statl's Supre1rn• Court case of the samt> name
whieh eom1wllt•d tlw dPcision, and cites only a dissenting
opinion refprred to as a concnrring opinion which does
not disC'nss severability in any way and is a dissent from
tlH· majority opinion of this Court.

To illustrate the vagueness, ambiguity, and total
incongruity of the ordinance in question, consider the
following: Appellant was charged with a violation of
:32-2-l in that she directed a police officer to the B0n
Allwrt Aparb1wnts for pnrposPs of sexual intercourse.
ln J"PS1Jonse to a demand for hill of particulars asking
the follo\\·ing questions, tlw City gave the following
answers:

Q.

Fnd<'r what s<•dion or sections of 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Sa1t Lake Cit:' 1959, \ms
the defendant charged?

A.

Dd'endant wm; charged under section (8) of
32-2-l Rc•,·is0d Ordinanc<'s of Salt Lak<> City
19(15.
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Q.

\Vho, if anyonP, offt'l"Pd ::::exual intncourse
for hire to a Salt Lake City pol ic:Prnan ~

A.

Sexual interc:ourse for hire wa1:; offered a
Salt Lake City Policeman b\·
Pe<wv
LoveJ.OY
•
bb.
• '
also known as Peggy Allred, and by Angie
Cologne, also known as Angie Paposakis.

Q.

Who was the person purportedly din•cted to
Apartment 506 at the BPn Allwrt hy the
defendant?

A.

Salt Lake City Police Officer Stan .Jorgenson
was the person directed to the B<•n Albert
Apartment by Peggy Lovejo>·, also known as
Peggy Allred, Defendant.

It would appear from the plt•adings that Mrs. Allred
may possibly have been guilty of subsection (2) of the
ordinance or subsection (7) of the ordinance, or possibly
subsection (1) of the ordinance for offering sexual intercourse for hire (though she did not offer to commit an
act of sexual intercounw for hirP), but in any one of
those subst>ctions she would have been the principal and
not an aider or alwttPr. It is hasic that onP cannot aid
or abet thernst>lves.

T'he ambiguity of the ordinanc:e as a ·wholP is such
that tht> City misunderstood the ordinance in making the
charge, and the Supreme Court in the majority opinion
on rehearing construed the charge in its discussion of
muhiguit>· as charging Pt>g-p;y Allred with aiding or abetting in the crimt> set forth in suhsection (7) of directing
or offering to direct any person to any place or building
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for th(' purpos<' ot' nmunitting an:- !Pwd act or ad ol'
H'Xnal int<'l'<'Olll"S<' for hin· or of moral pPrY<'rsion.

lt will lw noted that in tlH• final paragraph the Court
diseusses th<> ambiguity of phrases in snbs<>ction (7),
when both hy the complaint and hill of particulars the
('harg-r• was brought nnd<•r subsection (8).
POINT V
THE REHEARING OF THIS CASE WITH A NEW
DISTRICT JUDGE REPLACING ONE OF THE ORIGIN AL HEARERS, WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY KIND
TO COUNSEL, WAS AGAINST THE SPIRIT AND
IMPORT OF REHEARINGS AND THE GREAT MAJORITY OF LAW WITH RESPECT THERETO, SEE
CORDNER v. CORDNER, 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828,
AND CASES CITED THEREIN.

rnw relwaring of the easP ,,-ith a new judge sitting
to replaC'P om• of the form<T majority judg<>s, without
uotic<> to counsel, is not cont<>mplat<>d h:- the law regarding r<>h<>arings, hnt if' as stah•d hy this Court in Cordner
-r. Cordner, supra:
wrhe eff<:>ct of t}H• participation of a n<>W lllellilWl'
of the conrt, \dwre thP conrt is Pvenly diYidPd on
t1w CJllPstion aftpr the retireuwnt of tlw fornwr
member, would estahlish a precedent fraught "-itli
dangerons implications."
Also, it is statPd in RI' Tlwmpso11's f,'state, 27 Utah

17,

2(i~)

P. 108:
"'l11wn~, one of fop jnstic<'s of this eourt was incaparitat<>d hy illn<>ss and a distrid judge was
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called in to sit in his stead. The decision was
rendered by a divided court, tlw distrirt judge
voting with tht> majority. Bt>fore tlH· petition for
rehearing ~was lll'ard, the incapacitatvd justice had
died and the vacancy filled by appoi11hw•nt. Three
of tht• four jnstices ht>ld, without the <listrid judge
participating, that the diHtrict judge was (•11titled
to sit with the other members of tht> court, excluding the newly appointed justice, to <ld<·nni11<· the
matter of rehearing. On merits, tlw }H'tition for
rehearing was denied by the sauw votP of thrP<> to
two as in the original decision. The pffrct of that
decision was the exclusion of the n<>wly appoint<>d
justice from passing on the petition for n'lH•aring,
notwithstanding he was at the time a qnalifiPd
member of this conrt."
Tlw <·ase of lVoodlntry r. Dorman, 15
~74),

~[inn. :~41

(Gil

is also cited with approval in the Thompson case,

~mpra, tl1P

eourt

tlwn~

stating:

wn1e majority of this court as it was constituted

at the time of the original hearing, and decision
of this case, after much discussion and delilwration, came to conclusions (myself disst>nting)
~which led to the affirmance of the judgment. Since
the decision was filed, the author of the majority
opinion has been succeeded by the prese>nt chief
justice>. Were the court not constituted as it was
when the decision was rendered, then" is not thP
slighte>st reason to suppose that the decision wonld
he changed. So that if a re-argument were now
allowed, and the former decision reversed, this
rt>sult would follow, not from a eonYietion upon
the part of the members of the court h~· which
tlH' east> was originall;.· lward and detennint>d, that

..'
'

tlw de('.ision was e1Torn·ous, 110r from tlw <·011si<kration of reasons and arguments not lwfon·
advam·ed and considerrd, hut solPly from th<·
change in tlw composition of th(' court. Fnd<'r
such circmnstances, a relaxation of the ordinanru]('s governing applications for n•-argm11ent,
wonld se0m to hP pecnliarl:- ill-tinwd. It \rnuld,
in our opinion, ht> a violation of properties in th<'
administration of justice, which it is the dnt:- of
a court to maintain, and would tend to destroy that
n•spect for, and confidence in judicial trihnnab,
the loss of which PY<'n- good citizen would d<'plore."
POINT VI
APPELLANT'S POINT III REMAINS ENTIRELY
UNDISPOSED OF AND UNDISCUSSED.

Judge Tuekett in the m'xt to last paraµ;raph of tlw
first rnajorit:- O}linion states:
"In view of onr dc->cision ahoYe, it is unnecessary
to discuss tlw othrr contentions of appellant."
ThP rnajorit,Y opinion

m~itlit•r

discusses, disposes of.

nor mentions appellant's Point III.
POINT VII
THE MATTER, IF REHEARD, SHOULD HA VE
BEEN REHEARD BY THE SAME COURT OR SUCH
PORTION THEREOF AS WAS STILL SITTING AND
NOT DISQUALIFIED.

Nmd1<•rp in onr law nor m the n·<·ords of the Su-
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pn'lllP Court can the ·writer find a criterion for selecting

a District Judge to sit on the Supreme Court Bench to
replaee a .Justice who is deceased, absent, or disqualified,
as the case may be.
It would appear that the practice has been for the
Chief Justice or, in his absence, the acting Chief Justice
to call in a District Judge when nrcessary, whether that
.Judge is selected by lot, by following an alphabetical
or chronological list, by availability, or by choice of the
assigning Justice does not appear by rule in general nor
by minute entry in the instant case.

It seems manifastly unjust when• one of the original
Justices concurring in a majority opinion for any reason
does not sit on a rehe'aring to allow one of the former
dissenters or, for that matter, one of the former Justices
siding with the majority opinion, to select a new judge
to break the apparent deadlock.
In the spirit and rationale of the procedural rules,
the cases on rehearing, and in the interest of justice, the
matter should have (a) been heard by the remainder of
the original Court, (b) been continued pending the return
of the absent Justice.
SU~E\TAHY

Wherefore,

appellant respectfully requests this

eonrt to eonsider this petition for rehearing and, in view
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of the poinb herein, to set aside ih; opinion filed Febrnary 9, 19GS, and reinstate the opinion of July 17, 19G7.
RespectfuU~,

submitted,

HATCH & McRAE

